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 FACE PROCESSING ABILITIES IN CHILDREN WITH AUTISM 
Joyce Lynne Giovannelli, M.S. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
 
The current study was comprised of three experiments that examined face processing abilities in 
children (aged five to seven) diagnosed with high functioning autism as compared to control 
participants matched on verbal mental age and chronological age. Experiment one examined 
recognition memory for faces using an implicit memory task in which peripheral cues for 
identity were removed and distinctiveness of facial stimuli was varied.  Experiment two was 
designed to assess gender identification skills with gender stimuli that varied in the degree of 
typicality of gender. Experiment three examined the recognition of facial expression of emotion 
using dynamic stimuli that varied in the degree of expression exhibited, from subtle to 
exaggerated, as evidenced by increased facial muscle movement.  Results indicated children with 
autism exhibited significantly poorer performance on all three face processing tasks, as 
compared to controls.  Among children with high functioning autism, results of experiment one 
indicated that they do not capitalize on distinctive features as a way of improving memory for 
faces.  Results of experiment two indicated that, as compared to controls, children with autism 
exhibited more difficulty discriminating gender, even with typical exemplars of gender.  Results 
of experiment three suggest that children with autism found it more difficult to identify dynamic 
representations of facial expressions of emotion when the expressions were more subtle in 
presentation.  Although children with autism exhibited significantly poorer performance on all 
three tasks, they were still able to perform at a level above chance, indicating that by the ages of 
five to seven, children with autism were able to process facial information, although they were 
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developmentally delayed when compared with controls. These results are discussed in the 
context of several current theories of autism and the literature of both autism and typically-
developing face processing abilities.      
 v 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Autism is a developmental disorder with onset prior to age three and is characterized by 
qualitative impairments in social interaction and communication, as well as the presence of 
restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests and activities. Autism is part 
of a range of disorders that includes Asperger’s Syndrome and Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS).  These syndromes are jointly referred to as 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs).  It has been proposed that the underlying neurobiological 
bases are shared and each individual case can be conceptualized along one or more dimensions 
of severity (Schultz, 2005).  According to the DSM-IV, Asperger’s Sydrome differs from autism 
in that no language delays are present early in development (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000), although pragmatic language deficits are typically found by school-age. PDD-NOS is 
diagnosed when clinically significant social impairments are found, along with either 
communication or behavioral deficits, but not both.  Recent epidemiological evidence suggests 
that the incidence of ASDs in the general population is on the rise and may now range from 1 in 
300 to as high as 1 in 200 (Fombonne, 2003). 
  Higher prevalence rates have contributed to increased interest in attempting to 
understand the underlying mechanisms that may account for the specific pattern of deficits 
observed in those with autism. Currently, two conceptualizations of these underlying 
mechanisms have been the topic of debate. One conceptualization is that the deficits seen in 
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autism are primarily domain specific social motivational/ affective in nature, rather than due to a 
more general cognitive deficit (Dawson, Webb & McPartland, 2005; Schultz, 2005).  While 
social motivational/affective accounts for the deficits seen in autism are able to explain the 
classic diagnostic triad, as defined in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), 
they fail to account for documented cognitive deficits that are not related to overall intellectual 
functioning (e.g.,  Frith & Happe 1994), but are nevertheless seen in autism.  An alternative 
conceptualization of the underlying mechanisms accounting for symptoms seen in autism is that 
a more general cognitive deficit may be present (Frith, 1989; Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Strauss, 
2004).  One such theory is weak central coherence (Frith, 1989). 
  Frith (1989) suggests the deficits found in autism result from a general cognitive 
disorder that impairs central coherence abilities.  A perceptual processing deficit is present, 
which interferes with the ability to integrate diverse information, or abstract information, to 
obtain higher level meaning from contextual information. Weak central coherence has face 
validity. It mirrors the characteristic learning style observed in those with autism, which is 
attention to detail in the environment to the exclusion of overall understanding of context (Klin 
et al., 2002), and the inability to abstract.  Empirical evidence supporting weak central coherence 
theory includes the finding that, unlike typically-developing children, those with autism do not 
demonstrate an increase in recall ability for words that are learned within a contextual framework 
(Hermelin & O’Connor, 1970;  Tager-Flusberg, 1991).  In addition, individuals with autism 
consistently outperform controls in tasks requiring focus on local level of detail, such as the 
embedded figures test and block design Wechsler subtest (Shah & Frith, 1983, 1993).  
Individuals with autism also fail to succumb to visual illusions (Happe, 1996), suggesting 
 2 
superior attention to detail at the featural level, without abstracting information from the entire 
perceptual stimulus. 
As Klin et al (2002), however, points out, proponents of weak central coherence theory 
fail to focus on, or account for, the profound social deficits found in individuals with autism.  
Instead, weak central coherence theory focuses primarily on perceptual deficits, such as the 
inability to define the whole as a sum of the parts. So it seems that specific social theories of 
autism cannot explain general cognitive deficits, while cognitive theories of autism cannot 
adequately explain social deficits seen in autism.  The purpose of the present document will be to 
argue that one such cognitive theory, weak central coherence, may provide explanatory power 
for social, as well as cognitive, deficits seen in autism.    
 According to the DSV-IV, the domain of social deficits is specific to autism and is an 
important part of the diagnostic criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  Social 
deficits include failure to develop typical peer relationships, poor eye contact, failure to 
spontaneously seek to share enjoyment or interests, and failure to use appropriate emotional 
intonation or facial expressions.  This is in contrast to the other two diagnostic domains, 
communication and restricted and repetitive behavior, which are found in other developmental 
disorders and in mental retardation syndromes (Schultz, 2005). Therefore, any theoretical 
perspective which adequately accounts for deficits seen in autism should focus on syndrome 
specific social dysfunction.  Many early social impairments found in autism, such as deficits in 
joint attention, eye contact, attention to faces, and responding to emotional displays, involve the 
ability to process information from faces (Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005). 
One social impairment in individuals with autism, an impairment in face processing, has 
recently become the focus of much autism research.  It is known that in typically developing 
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infants, face processing abilities are present as early as the first weeks of life (Goren, Sarty, & 
Wu, 1975; Walton & Bower, 1993) and remain an important aspect of social interaction 
throughout life. Concerning autism, little is known about face processing abilities prior to 
school-age, but numerous studies have identified face processing deficits in older children and 
adults (e.g., Boucher & Lewis, 1992; Boucher, Lewis, & Collis, 1998; Gepner, de Gelder, & de 
Schonen, 1996; Klin et al. 1999;  Klin et al. 2002; Langdell, 1978; Tantam, Monoghan, 
Nicholson, & Stirling, 1989).  
A model that may extend the perceptual/contextual deficits explained by weak central 
coherence into the social realm of face perception has been proposed by Valentine (1991, 1999).  
Weak central coherence emphasizes that individuals with autism tend to focus on featural aspects 
of stimuli and fail to abstract knowledge to understand a contextual whole. Valentine has 
proposed a model of face perception abilities in typically developing adults which necessitates 
the ability to extend understanding beyond the featural level and abstract information to develop 
expertise with experience. Both Valentine’s model, as well as current the face processing 
literature for both typical individuals and those with autism, will next be discussed within the 
context of three areas of face processing: (a) recognition and memory for faces; (b) gender 
discrimination; and (c) emotion recognition 
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1.1 RECOGNITION AND MEMORY OF FACES: VALENTINE’S FACE SPACE 
MODEL OF FACE PROCESSING 
 
 
The role of experience and learning has been a primary area of focus in the adult face 
processing literature. Experience has been shown to be a very important factor in both face 
perception and recognition of faces.  Valentine (1991, 1999) has proposed an experience-based 
face space framework that dominates the adult facial perception and recognition research.  The 
face space can be conceptualized as a multiaxial, n-dimensional space representing all possible 
aspects of a face including both configural (e.g. distance from eyebrows to eyes) and featural 
(e.g. size of nose, color of eyes) information. In this framework, faces are stored according to the 
value of their features.  The dimensions of the face-space framework depend upon an 
individual’s experience with faces, although it is an inherent assumption of Valentine’s theory 
that all of the feature distributions are normally distributed.  Therefore the center of this 
framework represents the central tendency of all features.  As an individual gains experience 
with faces, these faces are represented in the face-space framework according to the values of 
their features. With more experience, the distributions become more refined and the central 
tendencies become more accurate   Faces with more typical features are stored closer to the 
center of the axes than faces containing distinctive features.  Thus, with experience over time, the 
center of the face space, where typical facial-feature information is stored, becomes densely 
packed.  
 The periphery of the face space, where more distinctive (i.e. less typical) face 
information is stored remains less populated. With increasing distance from the center of the 
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axes, stored facial representations become more distinctive and more easily recognizable because 
of less interference with other stored representations.  For example, a caricatured face would be 
stored farther away from the center than a veridical face, and would therefore be more distinctive 
and easily recognizable. Research has provided support for the notion of this distinctiveness 
effect; adults are able to recognize and remember a caricature more accurately than the depiction 
of a familiar veridical representation of the same face (Rhodes, Brennan, & Carey, 1987).  The 
development of a face-space framework depends on experience and implies knowledge of the 
range of feature values present and configural relationships of those features in the environment.  
Thus, Valentine’s (1991, 1999) face-space model encompasses both featural and configural 
aspects of face processing. 
1.2 FEATURAL AND CONFIGURAL PROCESSING 
There is no clear consensus regarding the definition of the terms featural and configural 
in the face processing literature (Newell, 2004).  For the purpose of the present document, 
featural processing refers to encoding and recognition of faces based upon one or more features, 
with no reference to the relationships among features.  Configural processing refers to the 
encoding and recognition of faces with respect to the spatial relationship among the individual 
facial features (Schwarzer, 2000).  Featural processing has been conceptualized as a less 
advanced manner of processing stimuli, while configural processing is thought to reflect more 
advanced processing.  Controversy exists as to the extent to which featural versus configural 
information may be critical to performance (Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Hosie, Ellis, & Haig, 1998; 
Macho & Leder, 1998; Parks, Coss, & Coss, 1985; Rhodes, 1988; Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1995; 
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Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). A substantial amount of evidence exists, however, to suggest that 
adults show superior face processing abilities when faces are presented in an upright 
configuration (Yin, 1969).  In addition, they rely primarily on configural processing when 
presented with upright faces, while relying more on featural processing when examining inverted 
faces (Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996).  Furthermore, Ingvalson and Wegner 
(2005) have recently conducted a series of experiments showing that featural and configural 
information are processed independently of one another.   
Research examining adult attention to high- versus low-spatial frequency information 
found in faces has provided additional evidence that while both types of processing are used in 
adult face perception, configural processing appears to dominate (Tanaka & Farah, 1993).  
Deruelle et al. (2004) explains that visual information is analyzed through a series of channels, 
which are attuned to different frequency ranges.  High frequency ranges encompass featural 
information, while low frequency ranges contain configural information.  Studies of face 
processing indicate that low spatial frequency information is processed more quickly, and used 
more frequently (e.g. Fiorentini, Maffei, & Sandini, 1983; Schyns & Oliva, 1999; Sergent, 
1982). The distinction between featural and configural processing is an important one when 
examining the development of face perception skills. 
1.3 TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FACE PERCEPTION SKILLS FOR 
RECOGNITION AND MEMORY OF FACES 
The primary focus of research addressing the development of face recognition and 
perception skills in infants and children has been on changes in processing strategies.  For 
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example, Diamond & Carey (1977, 1986) proposed a processing-shift hypothesis in which 
children primarily employ featural processing strategies until age 7-10 and then shift to a more 
advanced, configural processing style. Research indicates that with development, children slowly 
shift from a predominant reliance on processing more featural aspects of faces to having adult 
expertise at processing configural or spatial aspects of faces (Mondloch, Dobson, Parsons, & 
Maurer, 2004; Mondloch, Le Grand, & Maurer, 2002; Schwartzer, Huber, & Dummler, 2005).   
 Regardless of processing style, it is known that newborns are attracted to faces within 
hours of birth (Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975; Johnson & Morton, 1991) and will track facial stimuli 
further than other stimuli (Goren et al., 1975). Although a newborn cannot see fine details of 
faces, it appears that they can recognize their mother’s face based upon head shape and outer 
contours of the face (Maurer, 1985).  It is not until about one month later that an infant is able to 
recognize their mother based on the presence of features, in the absence of lower level perceptual 
cues such as head shape (de Haan, Johnson, Maurer, & Perrett, 2001; Pascalis, de Haan, Nelson, 
& de Schonen, 1998; Pascalis, de Schonen, Morton, Dereulle, & Fabre-Grenet, 1995).   
Face knowledge continues to develop throughout childhood (Newell, 2004).  Current 
research indicates that by the end of the first year infants are able to remember faces.  They can 
also abstract prototypes (de Haan, et al. 2001; Strauss, 1979) and categorize gender (Newell & 
Strauss, in prep).  Evidence suggesting that young infants process faces featurally rather than 
configurally comes from the inverted faces literature.  Researchers have theorized that faces 
presented in an inverted orientation cannot be processed configurally, since inversion is thought 
to disrupt configural processing, and therefore are not remembered as well as upright faces.  
Faces presented in an inverted orientation require a more featural method of processing faces 
(Bartlett & Searcy, 1983).  Young infants do not show the same advantage for upright faces as 
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do adults, suggesting that the primary face processing method used by infants is featural (Cashon 
& Cohen, in press). It is not until five to six months of age that an advantage for upright faces is 
found.  These data provide support for the hypothesis that by five to six months of age, infants 
are beginning to use at least some configural face processing strategies.   
Despite advances in the understanding of the development of face processing skills, little 
is known about Valentine’s face-space model (1991, 1999) regarding predictions about 
children’s ability to process faces.  Assuming the face space model is applicable to children, it is 
possible that distinctive faces would be easier to recognize and remember, and that performance 
would improve as experience with faces increased.  This is precisely what has been shown in a 
series of experiments conducted by Strauss (2004), which showed that nine- to ten-month infants 
demonstrate no advantage for recognition of distinctive over typical faces. However, by three- to 
four-years of age, children are beginning to show a slight recognition advantage for distinctive 
vs. typical faces.  The development of these skills, as evidenced by an emerging distinctiveness 
effect may be reflective of a growing face-space framework.   
1.4 DEVELOPMENT OF FACE PROCESSING SKILLS FOR RECOGNITION AND 
MEMORY OF FACES IN INDVIDUALS WITH AUTISM 
A growing body of literature suggests that most children and adults with autism have 
difficulty with both the perception of and memory for faces (Boucher & Lewis, 1992; Boucher, 
Lewis, & Collis, 1998; de Gelder, Vroomen & van der Heide, 1991; Ellis, Ellis, & Deb, 1994; 
Gepner, de Gelder, & de Schonen, 1996; Klin et al., 1999; Langdell, 1978).  The recognition 
abilities of individuals with autism, however, are clearly above chance and a few studies have 
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not found any facial recognition deficits (Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Langdell, 1978).  
However, even studies that have found face recognition and memory deficits in those with 
autism have only found an average of 15% impairment, when compared with controls. Clearly, 
individuals with autism are able to process faces, and their performance is not completely 
impaired, such as is seen in other populations (e.g. prosopagnosia).   
What, then, might account for the observed differences in face processing abilities?  One 
possibility is that individuals with autism do not process configural information as efficiently as 
typically-developing children.  This speculation is based on the finding that autistic individuals 
do not show the typical advantage for upright versus upside down faces (e.g., Hobson, Ouston, & 
Lee, 1988) and that they rely on peripheral details such as jewelry or clothing (e.g., Weeks and 
Hobson, 1987). In addition, data from several studies (Davies, Bishop, Manstead, & Tantam, 
1994; Hobson et al. 1988) suggest that children with autism recognize schematic face stimuli or 
photographs of faces by relying on facial features only.  Unfortunately, most of the studies 
examining face recognition and memory skills have not controlled for important issues such as 
whether the participants are being shown just facial information or peripheral information such 
as hair, clothing, or glasses. 
There has been limited discussion of what underlying processes may be different as a 
result of autism.  Some interesting possibilities have emerged from recent fMRI research. These 
studies (Critchley et al., 2000; Pierce, Muller, Ambrose, Allen, & Courchesne, 2001; Schultz et 
al., 2000) have shown that when individuals with autism process facial information, there is 
significantly less activation of the fusiform gyrus,  particularly the fusiform face area (FFA), and 
more activation in areas used in processing objects. The FFA has been identified as an area of the 
brain which activates selectively when face stimuli is presented.  Hypoactivation of the FFA, 
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together with poorer performance in face processing tasks, suggests that individuals with autism 
process faces differently, and perhaps not as efficiently as typically developing individuals.  
fMRI studies suggest that the facial discrimination and recognition deficits seen in 
individuals with autism may result from a lack of expertise with faces.  Such expertise is 
required when individuals are forced to discriminate or remember subtle internal facial 
configurations versus more salient peripheral features such as hair style, jewelry, or clothing.  As 
Elgar and Campbell (2001) suggest, this view fits with the developmental literature which 
indicates that during the course of development, children become better (or gain expertise) at 
distinguishing internal facial features and become less dependent on “paraphernalia”.  In 
contrast, individuals with autism may rely more than others on salient or distinctive features in 
order to discriminate and remember faces.  While these features may be external to the face (e.g., 
facial hair, hair style, jewelry) it is possible that they can use internal features that are 
particularly distinctive or salient.  For example, a very long nose or large forehead may be used 
for identification if they are particularly distinct.  
 More specifically, Pierce and colleagues (Pierce, Muller, Ambrose, Allen, & 
Courchesne, 2001) suggest that there may be a critical period for the development of the FFA.  
Research (e.g. Cohen & Strauss, 1978; Strauss, 1979; Lewis & Strauss, 1984) in the area of both 
face perception and concept development would indicate that this period occurs during infancy.  
It is possible that individuals may experience abnormal development during this critical period, 
affecting the development of the FFA and maybe even configural processing, in general.  The 
same mechanisms that may account for face perception and recognition skills can be applied to 
another aspect of facial recognition: Gender identification.  
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1.5 TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION SKILLS 
Research indicates that adults demonstrate a very high rate of speed and accuracy when 
classifying gender of faces (O’Toole et al., 1998), particularly when the face has been rated as a 
typical representation of its gender (Newell, 2004).  Gender discrimination is based upon the 
fine-grained discrimination of features (e.g., nose length, chin width, etc.) which are maximally 
distinctive between males and females (Brown & Perrett, 1993; Chronicle et al., 1995; 
Yamaguchi, Hirukawa, & Kanazawa, 1995).  Not only are adults very good at classifying 
gender, they are also quicker to identify the gender of a face that has been rated as being very 
typical of its gender.  For instance, a male face that has been rated by adults as being very 
masculine is classified as male in a gender identification task significantly faster than a male face 
that has been rated as being somewhat less masculine (O’Toole et al., 1998).  This typicality 
effect may also be explained using Valentine’s (1991, 1999) face space framework.  Within the 
framework of Valentine’s model, O’Toole et al. (1998) speculated that there may actually be two 
face-spaces, one for female and the other for male faces.  Although distinctive faces (on the 
periphery of the face space) may be easier to recognize on subsequent exposures, they may be 
more difficult to initially classify, due to the fact that they deviate from the central tendency, or 
prototype, of their respective gender group. 
Developmentally, little is known regarding the effects of typicality on the ability of 
infants or children to categorize facial gender based solely upon internal facial features. 
Recently, Newell, Strauss, & Best (2003) have examined the developmental trajectory of gender 
identification in a cross sectional study using infants aged five, six, eight, and eleven months, as 
well as three-, four-, and eight-year old children. In addition to determining at what age infants 
begin to discriminate gender, these studies were designed to investigate whether more typical 
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representations of gender were classified more easily than less typical ones at various ages.  If 
the face-space model is correct, more typical faces should be easier to identify on the basis of 
gender. Using a habituation paradigm, it was found that five-month old infants could not 
categorize the gender of faces, regardless of their typicality.  By six months, however, infants 
were able to categorize gender, but only for typical faces.   
At age three, 70% of participants were able to discriminate gender (without hair cues) in 
typical faces, and 58% were able to discriminate gender for atypical faces.  By age four, 82% 
identified gender (without hair cues) in typical-gender stimuli and 69% identified gender in the 
atypical condition.  However, by age eight, typically-developing children exhibited gender-
identification abilities analogous to those of adults.   Based upon the proposed deficit in face 
processing abilities in those with autism, results could be predicted to be quite different for 
individuals with this disorder. 
1.6 DEVELOPMENT OF GENDER RECOGNITION SKILLS IN CHILDREN WITH 
AUTISM 
Few studies have been conducted examining gender recognition abilities in individuals 
with autism. Several studies suggest that individuals with autism may have difficulty 
discriminating gender (de Gelder, Vroome, & van Der Heide, 1991; Hobson, 1987; Hobson, et 
al., 1988). Strauss (2004) found a developmental trend when examining gender identification 
abilities in 8 to 12-year old children with autism.  Although high functioning children with 
autism showed improvement in gender recognition abilities from 8 to 12 years of age, they were 
still significantly worse than typically developing controls.  At age 8, children with autism 
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discriminated gender accurately in the typical condition at a rate of 94% (compared with 100% 
for controls) and 92% in the atypical condition (compared with 96% for controls).  At age 12, 
autistic children discriminated gender accurately at a rate of 97% in the typical condition and 
93% in the atypical condition.  Although these rates were well above chance, they were 
significantly worse than typically-developing controls.  More importantly, reaction time data 
revealed that while controls were considerably faster at identifying typical vs. atypical examples 
of gender, those with autism showed no reaction time differences between typical and atypical 
stimuli, suggesting the possible use of a different or compensatory process of gender 
identification.  Although a developmental progression in the ability to correctly identify gender 
appears occur in children with autism, further research with children with autism younger than 
age eight should be conducted for a more complete developmental picture. The same 
mechanisms that may account for face perception skills such as gender identification and face 
recognition can be applied to another aspect of facial recognition: emotion recognition. 
1.7 TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTION RECOGNITION 
Infants are extremely sensitive to facial expression (Bornstein & Arterberry, 2003, 
Diamond & Carey, 1977; Nelson, 1987) and studies using either paired comparison or 
habituation paradigms have shown they are able to discriminate among some facial expressions 
(Barrera & Mauerer, 1981a; Field, Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982; La Barbera, Izard, 
Vietze, & Parisi, 1976; Young-Browne, Rosenfeld, & Horowitz, 1977).  Four-month olds can 
discriminate happiness vs. other emotions, as shown through habituation paradigms (Camras & 
Allison, 1985, Everhard, Shucard, & Schucard, 2001; Kuchuk, Vibbert, & Bornstein, 1986). 
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Other studies have not found facial expression discrimination abilities to be present until five to 
six months (Charlesworth & Kreutzer, 1973). Still other research reports that the ability to 
discriminate facial expression of emotions improves from the ages of four to seven months 
(Caron, Caron, & Myers 1982).  However, research conducted by Ludemann & Nelson (1988) 
suggests that even at seven months, infants cannot categorize fear expressions and cannot 
discriminate fear from happy or surprise.  
By the toddler years, children have been reliably shown to correctly identify sad, and 
happy more than any other expression (Izard, 1971). The ability to correctly discriminate 
emotions continues to develop throughout the preschool years (Boyatzis, Chazan, & Ting, 1993; 
Camras & Allison, 1985; Markham & Adams, 1992).  Studies suggest that by the various ages of 
either five, seven (Tremblay, Kirouac, & Dore, 1987), or ten (Harrigan, 1984) no further change 
or improvement occurs (De Sonneville et al. 2002) in the ability to discriminate emotional 
expressions. Despite the equivocal evidence regarding when emotion recognition becomes fully 
developed, it has been established that by age six, basic emotions such as happy, mad, afraid, and 
sad seem to be fully developed, while more complex emotions such as surprise and shame 
continue to mature (Markham & Adams, 1992) until approximately age 7-10, when identification 
accuracy substantially increases.  De Sonneville and colleagues (2002) suggest that one 
mechanism that may contribute to increased identification accuracy through infancy to age 10 is 
the development of configural processing strategies.   
Increased ability to process face stimuli configurally, combined with the increased 
development of emotion-event prototypes (Shaver, Murdaya, & Fraley, 2001), through exposure 
and experience, may account for developing expertise.  Given that it has been proposed that 
individuals with autism have deficits in both configural processing (Hobson et al., 1988; Weeks 
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& Hobson, 1987), as well as prototype formation (Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Plaisted, 2001), the 
presence of emotion recognition deficits in individuals with autism would not be surprising. 
1.8 AUTISM: EMOTION RECOGNITION 
From the time when autism was first identified (Kanner, 1943), emotional deficits have 
been a primary diagnostic criterion. Many studies have examined the ability of both children and 
adults with autism to recognize common categories of facial expression (e.g. Hobson, 1986; 
Weeks & Hobson, 1987; Hobson et al., 1988; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers 1990; Capps, 
Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1992; Davies, Bishop, Manstead & Tantam, 1994; Gepner, Deruelle, & 
Grynfeltt, 2001). Despite this impressive body of literature, it remains unclear to what extent 
deficits in the ability to perceive facial expression contributes to the difficulties individuals with 
autism have regarding social interactions. In fact, it is still unclear whether individuals with 
autism truly have a deficit in recognizing emotional expression in faces. Some studies suggest 
the ability is intact (e.g Braverman, Fein, Lucci & Waterhouse, 1989; Davies, Bishop, Manstead, 
& Tantam, 1994; Gepner, Deruelle, & Grynfeltt, 2001;  Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1990), 
while others suggest it is impaired, relative to controls (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling & Rinaldi, 
1993; Gepner, de Schonen, & Buttin, 1994; Hobson, 1986, 1986a; Hobson et al.,1988; Loveland 
et al. 1997;  MacDonald et al. 1989; Sigman, Ungerer, Mundy, & Sherman, 1987; Teunisse & de 
Gelder, 2001).  One possible reason for mixed results in autism emotion recognition research are 
methodological differences across studies.  Studies have used different experimental procedures 
including sorting, matching, and identification.  These methodological differences have led to 
several debates in the literature (e.g. Celani, Battacchi, & Arcidiacono, 1999).  One of the 
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reasons these methodological issues are important is because, with some matching tasks used, it 
may be possible for individuals with autism to use compensatory strategies by matching on a 
simple perceptual cue as opposed to a true recognition of facial expression (Celani et al, 1999).  
A similar concern was raised by Baron-Cohen, Spitz, & Cross (1993) in discussing the finding 
that individuals with autism were able to perceive both happy and sad expressions but not 
surprise.  It may be that happy and sad are perceived by simple distinctive, differences in the 
mouth, whereas surprise may require more attention to the overall face, including the eyes.  
Attention to only one feature, such as the mouth, can be accomplished using simple featural 
processing, while simultaneous multiple-feature processing may require a more configural or 
holistic approach. 
Another limitation of previous autism studies regarding interpretation of facial expression 
of emotion is that the stimuli used are almost always exaggerated expressions of emotion.  It may 
be that featural cues are more salient in exaggerated expressions, allowing for successful task 
completion despite the use of a different process than that used by typically developing children.  
Finally, very few studies have attempted to use dynamic motion displays of emotional 
expression, and only one study has specifically compared the effect of dynamic versus static 
displays (Gepner, Deruelle, & Grynfeltt, 2001). This is surprising since, by definition, 
expressions are the result of muscle movement and are therefore dynamic in nature.  Gepner and 
colleagues ascertained that while typical children found it easier to recognize emotional 
expression in the dynamic condition, children with autism did not.  This suggests that children 
with autism may process facial expressions using different underlying processes. It might be that 
when dynamic stimuli of varying degrees of subtlety are presented to participants with autism, 
impairments may become more evident. 
 17 
1.9 SUMMARY 
In conclusion, as Nelson (2001) recently argued, there is much evidence to suggest that 
the perception and recognition of faces depends on a developing expertise with faces. Evidence 
from literature examining the typical development of face processing skills supports this notion. 
Valentine’s (1991, 1999) model of face perception may extend the perceptual/contextual deficits 
explained by the weak central coherence theory of autism into the social realm.  Valentine’s 
model of typical development suggests that critical elements in face expertise develop over time 
with exposure to many faces. The dimensions of the face space framework depend upon an 
individual’s experience with faces, although it is an inherent assumption of Valentine’s theory 
that all of the feature distributions are normally distributed and so the center of this framework 
represents the central tendency of all features. In addition, information from both featural and 
configural aspects of faces are used to increase knowledge about faces.  Research examining 
high and low frequency information contained in faces suggests that while configural and 
featural aspects of processing are important (Deruelle et al., 2004), by adulthood, configural 
information is primary in the ability to identify faces, at least in the upright position (Bartlett & 
Searcy, 1993; Searcy & Bartlet, 1996).  It is unclear, however, how Valentine’s model might 
apply to the development of face processing skills in autism, given the paucity of developmental 
information available relative to this disorder.  
In the adult autism literature, controversy regarding face processing abilities exists, with 
some studies finding deficits in face processing skills such as identification of emotion (e.g., 
Hobson, 1986, 1986a, MacDonald et al., 1989) while others have not (e.g. Braverman, Fein, 
Lucci, & Waterhouse, 1989; Hobson et al., 1988).  Although most autism studies have focused 
primarily on adults, some studies have examined skills in adolescence (Teunisse & de Gelder, 
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2001) and in children older than eight (Langdell, 1978; Strauss, 2004) Few studies, however, 
have examined younger children’s face processing abilities.  In terms of gender identification 
abilities, no studies have examined these skills in children with autism who are younger than 
eight. This is in stark contrast to the available literature on the typical development of face 
processing skills, in which literature exists from early infancy to adulthood.  Obviously, it would 
be impractical to attempt to study face processing abilities in those with autism during infancy, 
since diagnosis cannot reliability be made until 18-24 months, although research is being 
conducted to ascertain if autism can reliably be diagnosed as early as15 to 18 months (Filipek et 
al., 1999). The purpose of the present study was to examine face processing skills in the 
youngest verbal population of children with autism in which testing is deemed to be practical.  
Since a language delay is one of the primary diagnostic criteria of autism, it was determined that 
age five would be an appropriate age at which it might be expected that high functioning children 
with autism would have, at least, rudimentary receptive and expressive conversational skills.   
In the current study, three aspects of face processing were examined: recognition 
memory, gender identification, and identification of emotional expression. These face processing 
skills were examined in five- to seven-year-old children with autism and controls matched on 
verbal mental age and chronological age.  The age group of five to seven was chosen because no 
previous studies have examined all three of these aspects of face processing in this age group.  
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2.0  EXPERIMENT ONE: RECOGNITION MEMORY 
According to Valentine’s face space model, distinctive faces are more easily identified 
and remembered. This distinctiveness effect occurs because distinctive faces are stored on the 
periphery of the face space, where less information is stored. The center of the face space 
framework, where information regarding more typical (less distinctive) faces is stored, is thought 
to be densely packed.  Distinctive faces, which are stored in the less densely populated periphery, 
are more easily accessible to memory. Recall that Valentine’s model suggests that expertise is 
gained by experience and through abstraction of information regarding both configural and 
featural aspects of faces. Thus, in order to demonstrate the distinctiveness effect, individuals 
need to learn how critical facial features are varying (e.g., eye separation, nose length, etc.) and 
ultimately abstract the mean value of these variations.  It is assumed that the values of these 
features are normally distributed and that distinctive features represent the “tails” of the 
distribution.  While there is limited research exploring how early typically developing children 
demonstrate this distinctiveness effect, there is reason to believe that it begins in infancy 
(Newell, Strauss, & Best, 2003).  Therefore, typically developing children are expected to 
remember distinctive faces better than more typical or common faces.  There is reason to believe 
that this memory advantage for distinctive faces will not be demonstrated in children with 
autism.  First, they may have less experience with faces.  Second, based on previous research, 
they may not be able to abstract prototypic representations of the feature variations.  Finally, 
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based on the weak central coherence theory, they may not be able to abstract configural 
information.  An implicit memory task was chosen because all prior studies examining 
recognition memory abilities in individuals with autism have used explicit memory procedures 
where participants were told they would be asked to remember the faces they observed.  
2.1 METHOD 
2.1.1 Participants 
Participants consisted of 19 children who were previously diagnosed with High 
Functioning Autism (HFA) by various psychologists in the community.  HFA is defined by a 
significant impairment in all three areas of the DSM-IV diagnostic triad of social, behavioral, 
and communicative, deficits (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) without co-occurring 
mental retardation.  High functioning children were chosen for this study because this allows for 
the examination of impairments that are specifically associated with autism rather than with 
mental retardation (Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1997). The age range of five to seven was 
chosen in order to fill a gap in the literature; no face processing data exists regarding children in 
this age group.  Diagnosis of HFA was confirmed by administration of the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule – Generic (ADOS-G; Lord et al., 2000), a conversation interview 
administered directly to the participant.  The staff administering the ADOS-G had extensive 
clinical experience with autism and completed a week-long training and reliability course held 
by the first author of the ADOS-G.  Eighteen control participants were matched on chronological 
and a standard score equivalent of Verbal Mental Age (VMA).  A standard score equivalent of 
VMA was obtained using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – Revised (PPVT-R; Dunn & 
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Dunn, 1981), an instrument that has demonstrated adequate validity and reliability.  Controls 
were recruited by telephone solicitation using names purchased from a company that provides 
such information. No significant differences were found between groups in terms of 
chronological age and VMA (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1.  Sociodemographic characteristics of autism and control groups for all 3 
experiments 
 
 
 
                           Autism Group (N=19)           Control Group (N=18) 
  M     SD        Range      M         SD Range 
 
 
 
Age          76.58  (9.45)       60 – 92  72.00       (9.65)       61 – 92 
(in months) 
 
VMA         97.89        (15.86)      75 – 126               105.61      (11.99)      76 – 124 
 
 
Gender  14:5            11:7 
(M:F) 
 
Ethnicity                      19 Caucasian                                            18 Caucasian 
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2.1.2 Apparatus 
Each participant was seated in front of a 17-inch monitor controlled by a Dell laptop 
computer.  The laptop computer was facing the examiner and the 17-inch monitor faced the 
participant.  A second keyboard to be used by the participant was attached to the laptop 
computer, and a modified keyboard was placed over this keyboard.  The modified keyboard, 
which is commercially available for young children, had two large keys (approximately 2.54 cm. 
square) exposed.  The remainder of the modified keyboard was covered with black felt to inhibit 
distraction.  The two exposed response keys were labeled “yes” and “no”, and the position 
(left/right) of the “yes” and “no” labels was counterbalance across participants. 
2.1.3 Stimulus Materials 
The stimuli were digital color photographs of women’s faces (age = 18-30 years).  
Stimuli volunteers were required to remove any jewelry and wear a common black robe to hide 
their clothing.  In addition they were required to pull back their hair and wear a backwards black 
baseball cap. All volunteers were then photographed on a black background.  Thus, all stimuli 
differed only on internal facial features. An initial group of 71 photographs were rated by 
approximately 60 undergraduate students for distinctiveness on a 7 point scale, with 1 being very 
typical and 7 being very distinctive.    
Participants were given the following instructions: “ Imagine that you are in a crowd or at 
a party.  As you view people at the party, it is apparent that some people’s faces are much more 
distinctive, such as Jay Leno’s face, which would stand out due to his larger jaw area.  In 
contrast, a face such as a fashion model’s would be harder to remember (and distinguish from 
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other fashion models’ faces) because of the regularity of all features. Please note that 
distinctiveness and attractiveness are not the same. A fashion model’s face is very attractive, in 
part because of the regularity and average quality of all features.   Your job is to rate the 
following faces on a 7 point scale with 1 being very typical (like a model’s face) and 7 being 
very distinctive (like Jay Leno).  Based upon these ratings, three groups of stimuli were formed, 
faces that were rated most “distinctive” (M  = 4.34, SD = .27), most “typical:”(M =  2.95, SD = 
.25), and the faces that were rated in between the two groups, to be referred to as “neutral” (M = 
3.60, SD = .21) in their distinctiveness. Of these stimuli, six of the distinctive (M = 4.32, SD = 
.25), six of the typical (M = 2.28, SD = .23), and twelve of the neutral (M = 3.36, SD = .15)  faces 
were chosen for test stimuli.  A t-test indicated that the distinctive faces were rated as 
significantly different than the typical faces, t(10) = -14.62, p < .001.   
2.1.4 Procedure 
Participants were individually tested in a quiet room, either at home or in the laboratory.  
They sat in front of the computer monitor and were told that they were going to hear a story 
about a girl’s softball team who take a bus trip together.  Then participants were told that help 
was needed with the story and were given a “magic wand” with which to help.  First, they were 
shown a cartoon picture of a suitcase (either red or blue) and told that the team’s lunches were on 
the suitcase and needed to be placed on the bus.  They were told to touch the suitcase with the 
magic wand to place it on the bus.  When the participant touched the suitcase with the magic 
wand, the examiner surreptitiously pressed a key on the laptop, changing the frame. The next 
frame the participant saw was the same suitcase, except that it was now on the bus rather than 
outside of bus.  Thus, participants thought that their magic wand accomplished this task.  
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They were then shown a picture that had one of six possible softball team members in 
front of a picture of a school bus.  Participants were told that the friends look very similar to each 
other (because they all like to wear black baseball caps backwards) but are actually different 
people if you look at their faces.  Next, the participants were asked to help load the team 
members onto the bus by touching each team member on the nose with their magic wand. As 
with the suitcase, the participants then saw each team member on the bus in the next frame.  
Seeing each team member both in front of the bus and then on the bus allowed for further 
examination of each face stimulus. The procedure was repeated until all six team members were 
placed on the bus.  Each time the participant put a new team member on the bus, they were also 
exposed to the faces of all previous team members who were already placed on the bus.  Three of 
these team members were faces that adults previously rated as distinctive and three were 
previously rated as typical.   
In order to create a memory delay period, the children were then told a story about how 
the bus visited various places such as the ocean, mountains, zoo, etc.  At each stop on the field 
trip, the participants were told a brief story about the location.  The memory delay portion of the 
task lasted approximately three and one half minutes.   The last stop on the field trip was the zoo, 
where participants were shown a picture of a puzzled-looking driver standing next to the bus. 
They were told that it was time for the team members to go home and that the driver needed to 
get them back on the bus, but he could not remember who they were among all the other people 
at the zoo.  The participants were told that the bus driver needed help identifying the team 
members. Before identifying the team member, the participants were shown pictures of the red 
and blue suitcases and were asked to show which one had carried the team’s lunches by touching 
it with the magic wand.  This was to ensure that task demands were understood. 
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Participants were then shown a face (either previously seen or not) and were asked to 
press “yes” if they had seen the team member before and “no” if they had not.  Faces were 
shown in random order with six previously seen (distinctive or typical) faces and twelve neutral 
faces presented to each participant.  The start of each trial was controlled by the experimenter 
who made sure that the child’s attention was focused on the screen.  Once a trial started, the child 
saw a face, which remained on the screen until the child responded by pushing the “yes” or “no” 
keyboard button. This procedure was repeated until all stimuli were presented. 
2.2 RESULTS 
Several participants with autism expressed that they could not tell the difference between the 
previously seen and “new” team member faces and thus pressed the same key (either “yes” or 
“no”) each time a response was required during the task.  Therefore, in order to avoid inflated 
false alarm rates, percentage of agreement scores were not used for data analysis.  Instead, d 
prime (d’) scores were calculated. D prime is a statistical measure of sensitivity which takes into 
account both hits (proportion of “yes” trials to which the subject responded “yes”, and false 
alarm rates (the proportion of “no” trials to which the subject responded “yes”).  As shown in 
Figure 1, a significant recognition memory difference was found for controls when comparing 
typical (M = .27, SD = .68) versus distinctive faces (M = .64, SD = 1.03), t(17) = 2.65, p < .01 
(one tailed). For participants with autism, no difference was found when comparing responses to 
typical (M = .52, SD = 1.54) versus distinctive faces (M = .50, SD = 2.09), t(18) – 1.05, p = 1.5 
(one tailed). 
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 Figure 1. Differences in ability to remember typical and distinctive faces  
in children with autism versus controls. 
 
2.3 DISCUSSION 
 
Results are consistent with the hypothesis that children with autism would not show a 
distinctiveness effect, as evidenced by the lack of a significant difference between identification 
of typical versus distinctive faces.  Control participants, on the other hand, did show a 
distinctiveness effect, as shown by results indicating that they remembered distinctive faces with 
greater accuracy than typical faces.  These results provide support for the presence of a face 
processing deficit in recognition memory for children with autism by the ages of five to seven.  It 
may be that, as Valentine’s model suggests, expertise is gained by experience, and through 
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abstraction of information regarding both configural and featural aspects of faces. Thus, results 
are consistent with weak central coherence theory, which suggests that children with autism have 
deficits in both processing configural information and abstracting knowledge. 
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3.0  EXPERIMENT TWO: GENDER IDENTIFICATION 
Previous research indicates that adults are faster at classifying the gender of a face that is 
typical of its gender.  This is also explained by Valentine’s model.  Within the framework of 
Valentines model, O’Toole et al (1998) has hypothesized that that there may be two face space 
networks, once for male and one for female faces. Although distinctive faces may be easier to 
recognize on subsequent exposures, they may be more difficult to classify initially, in terms of 
gender, due to the fact that they deviate from the central tendency, or prototype, of their 
respective gender group.  Given deficits defined in Weak Central Coherence theory in children 
with autism, as well as their difficulty extracting prototypes (Klinger & Dawson, 2001), it is 
expected that children with autism will be impaired, compared with controls, in the ability to 
identify the gender of faces rated as less typical representations of gender 
3.1 METHODS 
 
3.1.1 Participants 
The same group of experimental (n = 19) and control (n=18) participants used in 
Experiment 1 will be used for Experiment 2. 
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3.1.2 Apparatus 
Each participant was seated in from of a 17-inch monitor controlled by a Dell laptop 
computer.  The laptop computer was facing the examiner and the 17-inch monitor faced the 
participant.  An additional keyboard was also attached to the laptop computer, and a modified 
keyboard was placed over the additional keyboard.  The modified keyboard, which is 
commercially available for young children, had two large keys (approximately 2.54 cm. square) 
exposed.  The remainder of the modified keyboard was covered with black felt to inhibit 
distraction.  The two exposed response keys were on the left and right side of the modified 
keyboard (corresponding to the “x” and “m” keys), and were covered with the iconic 
representations of a man on one key and a woman on the other, which could be removed to 
counterbalance left and right hand responses across participants.  
3.1.3 Stimulus Materials 
Approximately 80 digital videos were made of males and females ranging in age from 
18-30.  The videos were taken with a digital camcorder and downloaded into a computer.  
Stimuli volunteers were required to wear a common black robe to hide their clothing.  Volunteers 
were filmed with both their natural hair styles and with their hair hidden.  To hide their hair, they 
wore a basic black baseball cap backwards, with the hair drawn to the back.  When the videos 
were taken, they were framed so that just the face and a minimal amount of border were included 
on the video.  The volunteers were seated in front of a black curtain, which blended with the cap 
and robe.  With the robe, the cap, and the background all the same color, the videos provided a 
very dynamic display of just the face.  In order to elicit a natural pose from the volunteers and to 
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make the video as realistic as possible, volunteers recited a common nursery rhyme (Hickory, 
Dickory, Dock) during filming.  Twenty undergraduate students rated each of the 80 videos for 
typicality of gender on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 being very atypical of gender and 7 being 
very typical of gender (i.e., very masculine or very feminine).  The 12 most typical female videos 
(M = 4.45, SD = .42), the 12 most typical male videos (M = 4.73, SD = .22), the 12 least typical 
female videos (M = 2.45, SD = 0.39) and the 12 least typical male videos (M = 3.48, SD = .33) 
were selected.  The least typical faces were then presented to a second group of undergraduate 
students who were asked to determine the gender of each face to ensure that all of the faces were 
easily discriminable by adults.  t-tests indicated that the ratings for the typical and atypical faces 
were significantly different from each other, for both the male t(23) = 10.03, p < .001 and the 
female t(23) = 11.44, p < .001 videos. 
3.1.4 Procedure 
Participants were individually tested in a quiet room, either at home or in the laboratory 
In order to insure that the participants could understand the task, they were initially shown ten 
full body pictures of both genders in random order and asked to say whether the picture was of a 
“man” or a “woman” (“boy” and “girl” labels were also acceptable).  If the participant got all ten 
correct, they proceeded to the test phase.  It was explained to the participant that he or she would 
see a very short movie of a person talking, although they would not be able to hear what the 
person was saying because the sound was turned off.  Participants were told that their job in this 
game was to guess whether the talking person was a man or woman and to respond by pressing 
one of the two keys that were covered with pictures of a boy and a girl. Before the test trials were 
started, participants were asked to demonstrate what button they would press if they saw a movie 
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was of a man (or a woman).  Once they successfully demonstrated that they understood they 
were to push the “man” button for a male movie and the female button for a female movie, the 
test trials began.  While it was initially planned to record reaction time data, it became apparent 
that many of the children would respond verbally before they actually pressed the response 
button, despite being told not to do so.  Hence, reaction time data were not accurate and were not 
analyzed. 
Participants were shown a total of 40 videos with equal numbers of male and female 
faces, typical and atypical faces, and videos with and without hair cues in randomized order.  
The start of each trial was controlled by the experimenter who made sure that the child’s 
attention was focused on the screen  Once a trial started, the child saw a video of a “talking” 
male or female stimulus, which remained on the screen until the child responded by pushing the 
“male” or “female” keyboard button.  
3.2 RESULTS 
Of primary interest was whether there were any accuracy differences (as measured by the 
proportion of correct answers) between the control and the experimental participants, and 
whether the children’s accuracy was affected by either the typicality of the stimuli or the 
availability of hair as a feature. Thus a 2-way ANOVA was conducted that included Group 
(autism vs. control) as a between-subjects variable and Stimulus Type (typical with hair vs. 
typical without hair vs. atypical with hair vs. atypical without hair) as a within-subjects variable.   
Results indicated significant main effects for both Group and Stimulus Type, but more 
importantly a significant interaction between these two variables, F (3,105) = 2.70, p < .05.  As 
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shown in Figure 2, for the typical gender faces, the control participants were better at 
discriminating gender than were the participants with autism.  This was true both for when the 
hair cues were present, t (35) = -2.87, p < .01, and when hair was not present as a cue, t (35) = - 
2.82, p < .01.  In contrast, there were no differences between the groups in either of the 
conditions that used atypical gender stimuli. 
 
 
Figure 2. Differences in the ability to recognize both typical and atypical 
representations  of gender in children with autism versus controls. 
 
  Hair cues also had an impact on the participants’ ability to discriminate gender.  The 
participants with autism were better at discriminating gender when hair cues were present in both 
the typical, t (18) = 2.70, p < .05, and atypical t (18) = 2.32, p < .03 stimulus conditions.  While 
the hair cues helped the control participants discriminate the atypical gender stimuli, t (17) = 
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4.12, p < .01, it did not affect their discriminations of typical gender faces, t (17) = 1.80, p > .05, 
which were approaching ceiling performance in both the hair and cap conditions.   
3.3 DISCUSSION 
 
The results of this study indicate that as early as five to seven years of age, children with 
autism are less able to discriminate the gender of faces even with very realistic videos of the 
people.  This effect was only true with the typical faces, where the control participants were 
above ninety percent accuracy rate.  While the participants with autism were not poor at 
discriminating the typical faces, their performance did not match that of the controls.  
Interestingly, both the control and autism participants were considerably worse at discriminating 
the atypical faces.  Research by Strauss (2004) provides support for a growing face space 
framework between the ages of five to twelve.  By the age of 12, both children with autism and 
typically developing children showed an increase in the ability to classify the gender of atypical 
faces, and children with autism showed a relative impairment in accuracy (92% accuracy versus 
96% accuracy for controls).  In the present study, the relatively poor performance of both groups 
in classifying gender when stimuli were atypical may be indicative of an immature face space 
framework, with less experience of atypical examples of gender, as compared to typical 
examples of gender. 
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4.0  EXPERIMENT THREE: IDENTIFICATION OF EXPRESSION OF EMOTION 
Children with autism have been shown to exhibit impairment in the ability to process 
configural information.  Because recognition of expressions of emotion, particularly more subtle 
expressions, requires configural processing strategies, it is expected that children with autism 
will be impaired, relative to controls, in the identification of subtle facial expressions of 
emotions, although they may be able to identify exaggerated emotional expressions in a manner 
analogous to typical controls. This potential ability to identify exaggerated expressions may be 
due to the fact that when exaggeration occurs, it is easier to focus on individual features of the 
face to extract emotion information. 
4.1 METHOD 
4.1.1 Participants 
The same group of experimental (n = 19) and control (n=18) participants used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 were included in Experiment 3. 
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4.1.2 Apparatus 
Each participant was seated in from of a 17-inch monitor controlled by a Dell laptop 
computer.  The laptop computer was facing the examiner and the 17-inch monitor faced the 
participant.   
4.1.3 Stimilus Materials 
 Approximately 60 digital videos were made of males and females ranging in age from 
18-30 years.  The volunteers all wore a black robe to hide clothing and a backwards black 
baseball cap with their hair tied back. The videos were taken with a digital camcorder and 
downloaded into a computer.  Volunteers were filmed in front of a black background so that the 
videos provided a dynamic display of just the faces.  Each volunteer was instructed to model the 
facial expressions of “happy”, “sad”, “anger”, and “fear.”  All videos were viewed by students in 
the laboratory and the two best examples of each emotion were chosen by consensus.  One 
student making the consensus ratings had previous experience and training in the Facial Action 
Coding System (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). 
By consensus, the videos were edited so that they progressed from similar neutral 
expressions to an exaggerated pose of each expression. This was accomplished by careful 
examination of the videos in a frame-by-frame fashion.  Following this editing, each video was 
then divided into six film clips, with the end point of each clip exhibiting a slight but progressive 
increase from the last clip in the movement of appropriate facial muscles necessary to model the 
respective emotion.  Careful and repeated screening insured that the amount of increase in the 
movement of facial muscles required to pose an emotion was similar across all stimuli at each 
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cut.  For example, cut number four for all emotion stimuli had approximately the same muscle 
change from neutral for the appropriate emotion. 
Following this procedure, digital videos were then made for each of the six clips per 
emotion, with the starting point of each video always set at the neutral pose. Prior to the 
beginning of each clip, a black screen with a yellow “ball” of approximately one inch in diameter 
was shown on the screen.  This was done to provide a fixation point to ensure that attention was 
focused on the center of the screen prior to viewing each clip.  Each successive clip of an 
emotion ended at the next higher level of expression of emotion, as evidenced by increased 
movement of facial muscles. After final editing of videos, a coder trained in Ekman & Friesen’s 
(1975) Facial Action Coding System reviewed all videos.  The speed of each video was modified 
so that while they still appeared natural, all six clips of each emotion were presented to the 
participant for the same amount of time.  For example, each clip level of the emotion was 
presented for approximately two seconds even though the amount of information conveyed via 
movement of facial muscles increased for each clip of the video.  The speed was then 
standardized across all of the videos so that no exposure-time advantage would occur. 
Undergraduate students (N = 29) were used for standardization trials of the emotion clips.  
After viewing each two-second clip, the screen went blank, and participants were then asked to 
identify the appropriate emotion. In addition, they were asked to indicate how confident they 
were of their judgment on a seven point Likert scale, with one indicating a “guess” response, and 
seven indicated a “sure” response. The clips were presented from the most difficult (i.e. least 
muscle movement) to the least difficult (i.e., most muscle movement). After reviewing results of 
the pilot study, it was decided to eliminate the first two clips of each emotion due to difficulty in 
identification. Therefore, four clips of each emotion remained.  Pilot ratings indicated that by 
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Level III (out of IV) of each emotion video, the majority of participants were able to make an 
accurate identification. See Table 2 for accuracy percentages and “confidence in decision” 
ratings.        
Table 2.  Pilot Group Ratings of Emotion Stimuli 
Emotion   Percentage Correct  Confidence in Rating 
 Stimulus Level           Ma                (SD) 
 
Sad 
 Level 1    6.9%   2.79a  (1.24) 
 Level 2    37.9%   3.21a  (1.24) 
 Level 3    65.5%   3.48a  (1.18) 
 Level 4    69%   4.59a  (.63) 
Angry 
 Level 1    3.4%   2.97a  (.91) 
 Level 2    31.0%   3.48a  (1.15) 
 Level 3    51.7%   3.35a  (1.17) 
 Level 4    79.3%   4.24a  (.91) 
Fear 
 Level 1    17.2%   2.79a  (1.11) 
 Level 2    65.5%   3.79a  (1.08) 
 Level 3    93.1%   4.41a  (.63) 
 Level 4    82.8%   4.58a  (.63)  
Happy 
 Level 1    86.2%   3.79a  (1.01) 
 Level 2    93.1%   3.79a  (1.21) 
 Level 3    86.2%   4.48a  (.91) 
 Level 4    100%   4.86a  (.52) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a “Confidence in own rating” scale was a 7 point Likert Scale with 1  = “just guessing”  
to 7 = “completely sure” 
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4.1.4 Procedure 
Participants were individually tested in a quiet room, either at home or in the laboratory, 
and were seated in front of a computer 17-inch monitor screen attached to a laptop computer. In 
order to ensure that participants could accurately identify the facial expressions of happy, sad, 
anger, and fear, a pretest was given using 12 stimuli (three of each emotion) from the McArthur 
Emotion Display set. All participants accurately identified 100% of the pretest stimuli. Following 
pretest, participants were given the following instructions prior to the test phase.  “This is a game 
where you are going to look at people’s faces and try to guess what they are feeling.  You are 
going to see movies of people’s faces, and your job is to tell me how that person is feeling. First 
you are going to see a yellow ball on the screen and you need to look at the ball very closely, 
because the movies are going to be really fast…like this (snap fingers), and then you won’t see 
them anymore. For each face you can choose from these (present iconic faces): “happy”, “sad”, 
“anger”, “fear”, or “none.” OK? Let’s practice first. In some of the movies it will be easy to tell 
what the person is feeling, like this one (present sample “happy” clip, at level IV), and some of 
them are going to be hard, like this one (present sample “happy” clip at level I).  Ready to start?” 
Participants were then shown the level I video clips of each emotion in randomized order. 
After all level I clips were seen, each of the successive levels were shown, with randomization 
within each level. After the (approximately) two second presentation of a clip, the screen went 
blank.  At that point, participants were asked to identify the emotion they thought they saw on 
the clip.  They were presented with an array of iconic representations (i.e. “smiley faces”) of 
“happy”, “sad”, “anger”, “fear”, or “no emotion.”  
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4.2 RESULTS 
A series of chi-square tests were used to analyze results of the emotion recognition task. 
Table 3 presents the number of respondents answering correctly for each emotion and level of 
stimuli. 
Table 3. Recognition of Emotion: Number of participants who responded correctly 
at each level 
 
            Emotion                          Stimulus Level     Number of Participants Who Responded  
          correctly at each level  
                Autism          Control 
                                                                                    (n=19)               (n=18) 
Sad 
   Level 1   2  1  
   Level 2   4**  10**  
   Level 3   14  13  
   Level 4   17  16 
Angry 
   Level 1   0  1    
   Level 2   2  5  
   Level 3   6***  13*** 
   Level 4   14  16  
Fear 
   Level 1   0  0  
   Level 2   0***  7***  
   Level 3   8***  16***  
Level 4   12**  17** 
Happy 
   Level 1   6  7  
   Level 2   13*  16*  
   Level 3   17  18  
   Level 4   19  18  
 
*p = .1;     **p < .05;      ***p < .01 
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  Results indicated that control participants were significantly better than participants with 
autism at recognizing featural cues of “sad” at level II,  χ2 (1, N = 37) = 4.69, p < .05 (see Figure 
3). No significant differences were found for “sad” level I, χ2 (1, N = 37) = .31, p = .58; level III, 
χ2 (1, N = 37) = .01, p = .92; or level IV, χ2  (1, N = 37) = .003, p = .95. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Differences in ability to recognize facial expression of the emotion “sad” 
between participants with autism and controls. 
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Control participants were significantly better than participants with autism at recognizing 
featural cues of “angry” at level III,  χ2 (1, N=37) = 6.11, p < .01 (see Figure 4). No significant 
differences were found for “angry” level I, χ2  (1, N = 37) = 1.08, p = .29; level II, χ2  (1, N = 37) 
= 1.79, p = .18; or level IV, χ2   (1, N = 37) = 1.39, p = .24. 
 
 
Figure 4. Differences in ability to recognize facial expression of the emotion “angry” 
between participants with autism and controls. 
 
Control participants were significantly better than participants with autism at recognizing 
featural cues of “fear” at level II,  χ2  (1, N = 37) = 9.11, p < .01, level III, χ2  (1, N = 37) = 8.88, p 
<  .01, and level IV, χ2  (1, N = 37) = 5.34, p < .05 (See Figure 5). No significant differences were 
found for “fear” level I.  A chi-square could not be computed for “fear” level I because neither 
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the control participants nor the participants with autism correctly identified the face stimuli at 
this level. 
 
 
Figure 5. Differences in ability to recognize facial expression of the emotion “afraid” 
between participants with autism and controls. 
 
For the “happy” condition, a trend was observed in which controls were better at 
recognizing featural cues for this emotion at level II, χ2  (1, N = 37) = 2.29, p = .1 (See Figure 6). 
No significant differences were found for “happy” at level I, χ2  (1, N = 37) = .22, p = .64; level 
III, χ2  (1, N = 37) = 2.00, p = .16.  A chi-square could not be computed for “happy” level IV 
because all of the control participants and participants with autism correctly identified the face 
stimuli at this level.  
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 Figure 6. Differences in ability to recognize facial expression of the emotion “happy” 
between participants with autism and controls. 
4.3 DISCUSSION 
Typically-developing children were able to correctly identify “sad”, “anger”, and “fear” 
stimuli at one level of subtlety earlier than children with autism.  For “happy” stimuli, a trend 
was observed in which typically developing children were able to identify this emotion at one 
level of subtlety earlier than children with autism.  By level IV, when the expression of each 
emotion was presented in an exaggerated manner, participants with autism were able to identify 
each expression as accurately as the control children for all emotions except for “fear.”  
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Differences in performance between groups of participants may have occurred due to a 
configural processing deficit thought to be present in autism.  By level IV, performance became 
statistically equivalent in three out of four emotions (“happy”, “sad”, and “angry”), and this 
demonstrated ability of participants with autism to identify exaggerated expression as well as 
control children may have occurred because when exaggeration occurs, it becomes easier to 
focus on individual facial features to extract emotion information.  More subtle expressions, on 
the other hand, require attention to, and integration of, smaller cues.   For one emotion, “happy”, 
no significant differences were found between groups, and by level IV, both groups were at 
ceiling (100% accuracy).  This result may have occurred because “happy” is easier to identify 
using only one feature, the mouth, as compared with the other three emotions in this experiment, 
which require integration of information from both the mouth and the eyes.  
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5.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Results of the current study indicate that compared to typically developing children, five to 
seven year-old children with autism experience deficits in three areas of face processing, 
recognition memory, identification of gender, and emotion recognition.  In particular, children 
with autism had poorer recognition memory than control children and did not demonstrate any 
advantage for remembering distinctive faces.  On the gender discrimination task, the children 
with autism were less accurate than control children in classifying faces when the stimuli were 
typical representations of each gender.  For the less typical faces, both groups demonstrated 
difficulty in identifying gender correctly.   For the emotion recognition task, typical children 
were able to correctly identify the emotions of “sad”, “angry”, and “fear” at one level of subtlety 
of expression sooner than children with autism.  A similar trend was observed for the emotion 
“happy”, although both groups found this emotion easier to identify at all levels of subtlety.  
Since the same group of participants with autism was used across all three experiments, it 
was of particular interest to determine whether individual differences in patterns of performance 
across the three face processing tasks were present.  Both parametric and nonparametic statistical 
analyses indicated no significant patterns of individual differences in performance, even when 
taking into account VMA and CA of participants autism. 
At issue is what underlying mechanism might account for deficits in face processing abilities 
in children with autism.  Several models have been posited to account for results such as those 
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found in the present study.  One possibility is that of a domain specific social deficit (Dawson et 
al. 2005; Klin et al., 2003; Schultz, 2005).  An alternative possibility is that of a domain general 
cognitive/perceptual deficit, which affects all aspects of cognition, including social cognition 
(Klinger and Dawson, 2001; Strauss, 2004).   
5.1 SOCIAL MOTIVATIONAL/AFFECTIVE EXPLANATIONS OF FACE 
PROCESSING IMPAIRMENTS IN AUTISM 
Dawson and colleagues (2005) suggest a social motivational/affective explanation of face 
processing impairments. Face processing deficits, under this account, are thought to be caused by 
a fundamental deficit in social motivation.  Limited social motivation causes reduced attention 
not only to faces but to other social stimuli such as hand gestures and voices.  This lack of 
attention leads to decreased expertise in configural processing of faces, which in turn leads to 
differences in brain functioning in individuals with autism.  The authors speculate that “social 
motivational impairments in autism are related to a difficulty in forming representations of the 
reward value of social stimuli”, (Dawson et al. 2005, pg. 415).  This may be due to abnormalities 
in neural systems important for the perception of social rewards (Decety, Chaminade, Grezes, & 
Meltzoff, 2002; Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001). 
Dawson et al. (2005) further hypothesize that in typically developing children, 
representations regarding the reward value of social stimuli begin to motivate and direct attention 
during the second half of the first year of life. Because children with autism do not experience 
this social motivation, they spend significantly less time observing human faces.  
Consequentially, children with autism fail to become experts in face processing.  Drawing from 
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Nelson’s (2001) theory that experience drives cortical specialization for faces, this lack of 
experience may further result in a failure of specialization of regions of the brain that typically 
mediate face processing.  Atypical functioning in cortical areas proposed to drive face perception 
has been identified, and results have been replicated across studies (e.g., Aylward et al., 2004: 
Curby et al., 2003; Hall, Szechtman, & Nahmias, 2003; Pierce et al., 2001; Schultz, et al, 2000b).  
It has not been shown, however, whether identified atypicalities in cortical regions are a cause, or 
a result of differential face processing abilities in children with autism.  The authors also propose 
that this lack of neural specialization is further evidenced by slower information processing 
speed for faces. Slower processing speed for faces, as evidenced by EEG studies showing longer 
latency to peak in neural circuits proposed to be specialized for faces, have also been 
documented in the case of autism (McPartland, et al., 2004; Webb, et al., 2003).   
However, because there is no reliable method of diagnosing autism in infancy, there is very 
little empirical support for this early lack of attention to social information. Only one case study 
of an infant who was later diagnosed with autism has been presented (Dawson et al., 2000).  
Early data from this study suggests that during the first six months of life the infant smiled 
responsively and exhibited generally good eye contact. It was not until closer to one year of age 
that eye contact was rated as poor. This would seem to suggest that very early attention to face 
was more typical, drawing into question the assertion that infants with autism do not find faces 
inherently interesting.  This was only a case study, however, and more studies examining the 
social behavior of infants with autism need to be conducted when and if it is possible to identify 
this disorder earlier in development.  
Another model suggesting that a primary social motivational/affective deficit accounts for 
poor face perception skills in children with autism has been proposed by Schultz (2005). This 
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model suggests there is primary developmental failure in the amygdala, which causes a 
cascading influence on the development of cortical areas that mediate social perception in the 
visual domain. More specifically, it is proposed that typically developing infants are born with a 
perceptual bias for face-like stimuli.  This bias, combined with associative and instrumental 
learning during infancy, as well as the influence of amygdala functioning, leads to enhanced 
salience of faces. As a result, there is more attention to and subsequent experience with faces, 
and therefore greater perceptual skill. Enhanced attention and the resulting increase in perceptual 
skills for face processing are thought to be influenced by a region of the ventral temporal lobe, 
known as the fusiform face area (FFA) of the fusiform gyrus (FG). Greater skills with faces 
ultimately leads to scaffolding of more general social skills development.  
As Schultz (2005) explains, the amygdala reacts quickly to emotionally laden stimuli, 
signaling other brain areas to the salience of an event (LeDoux, 1996; Schultz et al., 2000a) and 
mediating formation of “emotional learning” (Anderson and Phelps, 2001; Anderson and Sobel, 
2003; Gaffan et al., 1988; LeDoux, 1996).  The amygdala provides critical emotional 
information to cortical areas, such as the FFA, for further processing. Deficits in face processing 
abilities, as caused by deficiencies in the amygdala-fusiform system could then lead to multiple 
difficulties in social interaction. 
There is evidence to suggest that both amygdala and FFA abnormalities in functioning are 
present in individuals with autism.  In postmortem examinations of the brains of individuals with 
autism (Bauman & Kemper, 1994; Kemper & Bauman, 1998), neurons in the amygdala were 
found to be small and densely packed because of the limited development of dendritic trees 
(Schultz, 2005).  More recently, fMRI studies have found that the amygdala is hypoactivated in 
individuals with autism during face perception tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Critchley et al., 
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2000; Pierce et al., 2001). Hypoactivation during face perception tasks has also been found 
across many autism fMRI and PET studies of the Fusiform Face Area (e.g., Aylward et al., 2004: 
Curby et al., 2003; Davidson et al., 2004; Hall et al. 2003; Pierce et al., 2001; Schultz, et al., 
2000b).  Piggot et al. (2004) were the first to use a sample of just children (N =14), and found 
similar results, hypoactivation of the FFA when facial stimuli were presented.  Despite the 
impressive body of evidence supporting both amygdala and FFA abnormalities, Schultz (2005) 
himself points out a difficulty with interpreting such evidence.  He purports that hypoactivation 
data in autism are not, by themselves, convincing evidence of a cause-effect relationship. Rather 
it would be just as easy to argue that autism is the cause of the hypoactivation of both the FFA 
and amygdala, not the result. Research continues to address this question.   
In summary, both Dawson and colleagues (2004) and Schultz (2005), suggest a model of 
domain specific social impairment, which accounts for both social and non-social cognitive 
deficits seen in autism.  Alternatively, it may be that a more general cognitive/perceptual deficit 
impacts not just cognitive processes, but also impacts the abilities needed to process social 
information.  Indeed, the deficit may not be just social in nature but social cognitive.  
5.2 BEYOND WEAK CENTRAL COHERENCE: EVIDENCE FOR A COGNITIVE 
EXPLANATION FOR FACE PROCESSING DEFICITS FOUND IN AUTISM 
While domain specific social motivational/affective models can account for deficits 
found in social functioning in those with autism, the mechanisms by which these models account 
for general cognitive deficits is less clear.  One model that accounts for more general 
cognitive/perceptual deficits found in individuals with autism is weak central coherence (Frith, 
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1989; Frith & Happe, 1994a; Happe, 1999; Shah & Frith, 1983, 1993).  Recall that this model 
suggests individuals with autism process information at a local or featural level, primarily due to 
a deficit in constructing and processing global or configural aspects of stimuli.  In addition, 
despite the fact that information is processed at a featural level, individuals with autism are 
expected to have difficulty abstracting this featural information from various exemplars to form a 
conceptual whole.  Support for this model includes data indicating that individuals with autism 
show superior performance in processing featural versus configural stimuli (Happe, 1996; Joliffe 
& Baron-Cohen, 1997; Mottron, Belleville, & Menard, 1999b; Shah & Frith, 1983, 1993) and a 
deficit in the ability to abstract featural information to form prototypes (Klinger & Dawson, 
2001; Plaisted, 2001).  
A model that extends the perceptual/contextual deficits explained by weak central 
coherence theory into the realm of face perception is Valentine’s face-space framework (1991, 
1999).  As previously explained, Valentine’s model of face perception abilities in adults 
necessitates the ability to process faces beyond the featural level and to abstract and store 
information. In addition, expertise is acquired with experience.  Results of the present study are 
consistent with deficits found as predicted by weak central coherence and its application to the 
face space framework.     
However, results of the present study also raise an interesting question that cannot be 
answered by extending the understanding of weak central coherence theory to Valentine’s face-
space framework. Although the present study found significant differences in performance across 
all three face processing tasks, it did not indicate that children with autism were unable to 
perform face processing tasks at all.  Rather, a relative weakness compared to controls was 
observed.  For example, when identifying the gender of individuals judged to be average 
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examples, children with autism were 87% accurate versus a 96% accuracy rate for controls 
(when hair cues were provided).  When no hair cues were provided, children with autism were 
79% accurate versus 92% for controls. If children with autism were not using configural 
strategies, as predicted by weak central coherence, to process facial information, it would be 
expected that their performance would be below chance on face perception tasks.  Clearly, this 
was not the case; therefore an alternative explanation for these results must be sought.  Another 
general cognitive/perceptual model, enhanced perceptual functioning, may provide explanatory 
power for the relatively poorer, although intact face processing abilities found in the present 
study.  
5.3 ENHANCED PERCEPTUAL FUNCTIONING IN AUTISM 
While weak central coherence (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe, 1994; Happe, 1999; Shah & 
Frith, 1983, 1993) posits that superior featural  processing is due to a deficit in configural 
processing, proponents of enhanced perceptual functioning (Mottron et al., in press, Mottron & 
Burack, 2001) attribute a featural bias in autism to a relative superiority of featural processing 
without accompanying deficits in configural processing. This hyper-functioning of featural, or 
low-level processing is thought to be mandatory, which interferes in situations where configural 
processing would be more advantageous. Therefore, configural processing, though intact, may be 
obscured by the hyper-functioning of low-level processing.  In other words, the default setting of 
autistic perception is more locally oriented than that of typically developing individuals.  Hence, 
an opposite pattern of processing emerges in autism compared with controls.  In typical adults, 
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top down or higher order processing takes precedence over low level perceptual processing, for 
example the Gestalt principles of perceptual organization. 
 The authors provide evidence to support their claims using various tasks administered 
across different labs. For example, concerning conflicting findings regarding visual illusion 
performance, such as in the case of the Muller-Lyer illusion in individuals with autism, Brownan 
et al. (2004) stated that individuals with autism are sensitive to that illusion only when asked 
‘which line looks longer,’ but not when asked ‘which line is longer.’ This finding suggests that 
while autistic perception is oriented towards the local level, global information is available. 
Further evidence comes from studies using the Block Design (BD) task of the Wechsler scales, 
where individuals with autism have been shown to perform significantly better than typically 
developing individuals (Shah and Frith, 1993). In the BD, each trial involves processing at a 
local level (a single block) and a global level (the figure).  When processing at the global level 
(completing the figure) conflicts with processing at the local level (segmentation of design into 
individual blocks), individuals with autism perform at a level superior to comparison groups.  A 
similar effect was found for two other tasks that involved both local and global processing, 
reproduction of possible and impossible figures (Mottron, Belleville & Menard, 1999b) and the 
Embedded Figures Task (Joliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997).   
A more recent study by Behrmann et al. (2006) lends further support to the hypothesis of 
a local bias with intact global processing (which is predicted by the Enhanced Perceptual 
Functioning model).  Navon (1977) stimuli were used for this experiment.  Navon stimuli are 
large hierarchical letters made up of small letters.  The identity of the local letters is either 
consistent or inconsistent with those at the global level.  Subjects are asked to identify the letter 
either at the global or local level.  In typically developing individuals the global letter is 
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identified faster than the local letter.  When the inconsistent condition is presented, however, a 
global-to-local interference is found, in which participants are more likely to identify the global 
letter than the local one, regardless of which one they were asked to identify. For typically 
developing individuals, Behrmann and colleagues replicated Navon’s results, finding a slight 
advantage for global over local processing in the consistent case and greater slowing in the 
inconsistent case when local identification is required (interference from locally incongruous 
letters). Although participants with autism were slower overall, a different pattern of 
performance was observed for them.  No differences in speed for global or local processing were 
found in the consistent trials.  In the inconsistent trials, however, an advantage was found for 
local over global processing (the opposite finding of the control group).  These finding are 
consistent with predictions made by the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning model; a bias towards 
local over global processing. 
This local over global processing bias is further evidenced by a failure of individuals with 
autism to abstract information to form an average, or prototype (Gastgeb Strauss & Minshew, 
submitted for publication; Klinger & Dawson, 1995, 2001; Plaisted, 2000; Strauss, 2004), in a 
manner analogous to controls.  According to Valentine’s face-space model, individuals compare 
each exemplar, or face, with prior stored representations during recognition memory. The face-
space framework is densely populated at the center of the axes, where average feature and face 
information is stored.  Atypical exemplars, or faces with distinctive features, are stored in the 
periphery and therefore information about distinctive faces is more readily accessible.  Hence, a 
distinctiveness effect occurs, wherein more distinctive faces are more easily remembered. 
Results of the current study, indicating that individuals with autism do not show a distinctiveness 
effect, are consistent with the prediction that would be made using Valentine’s model. 
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Taken together, these studies support the claim that cognitive/perceptual differences, as 
predicted by weak central coherence and enhanced perceptual functioning are present in autism.  
The weak central coherence model and the enhanced perceptual functioning model both provide 
explanatory power within the context of Valentine’s face space model, when attempting to 
understand face perception deficits found in autism. It may be that due to a local perceptual bias, 
children with autism do not become expert processors of configural face stimuli even though 
they can process configurally under some circumstances.  This lack of expertise in face 
processing has been documented across many studies, but it is possible that this deficit extends 
beyond face processing to other types of stimuli as well.  It could be that the complexity of face 
stimuli renders the task more difficult and so deficits are more apparent with faces. If the 
enhanced perceptual functioning model truly applies to cognitive abilities outside of the social 
realm, however, then a similar lack of expertise should be apparent in the processing of non-
social stimuli as well.  Currently, both neuroimaging studies and behavioral studies provide 
converging evidence suggesting that individuals with autism lack expertise in processing both 
social and nonsocial stimuli. 
5.4 NEUROIMAGING STUDIES 
Since the time that Kanwisher et al. (1997) first identified a region of the ventral temporal 
lobe known as the fusiform face area (FFA) numerous neuroimaging studies have examined the 
function of this area of the brain.  The FFA, located within the lateral portion of the fusiform 
gyrus (FG), differentially activates during the processing of face stimuli (Haxby et al., 1994, 
1999; Kanwisher et al., 1997, 2000; Puce et al., 1995). Kanwisher (2000) asserts that FFA 
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activity is twice as strong when viewing faces as compared with non-face stimuli such as backs 
of heads, animals without heads, and objects.  Evidence suggests that FFA engagement is 
automatic and mandatory when presented with faces or complex face-like stimuli (Winston et al., 
2004). Although all previous FFA studies found activation only for face like stimuli, Gauthier 
and colleagues (1998) questioned the accuracy of conceptualizing the FFA as specific to face 
processing.  Gauthier noted that faces are complex stimuli that vary only slightly from one 
another at the exemplar level.  Since all typical adults are exposed to a myriad of faces 
throughout life, they have become experts at face processing.  
At issue is whether the FFA of the FG is solely dedicated to face processing, or whether it 
actually represents an area of the cortex that activates when “experts” process subordinate level 
information. In an ingenious series of experiments, Gauthier and colleagues (2000) demonstrated 
that the FFA is also activated when participants who are experts with cars or birds view pictures 
from their area of expertise. Conversely, FFA activation does not occur when experts view 
stimuli outside of their area of expertise (e.g. a car expert examining bird stimuli).  Similarly, she 
has shown a significant increase from baseline to post-test FFA activation (Gauthier et al., 1998) 
for participants who are trained to be experts at recognizing subordinate-level novel stimuli 
called “greebles” (unfamiliar 3D objects with controlled variations in spatially distributed 
features).Since individuals with autism are not expert face processors, it is not surprising that 
numerous fMRI studies have found FFA hypoactivation when face stimuli are examined 
(Aylward et al., 2004; Curby et al., 2003: Critchley et al., 2000; Davidson & Dalton, 2003, 2004; 
Hall et al, 2003; Hubl et al., 2003; Pierce et al., 2001; Piggot et al., 2004).  
 If a lack of expertise for faces stems from a general cognitive/perceptual deficit rather 
than a specific social deficit, then the lack of expertise, as evidenced by fMRI activation should 
 56 
extend beyond face (i.e., social) stimuli, to encompass non-social stimuli as well. Previous 
studies examining object perception abilities in individuals with autism have found object 
processing to be intact, compared with impaired face processing abilities.  Upon more careful 
examination of the stimuli used in studies comparing face versus object processing, a 
methodological problem emerges. Object stimuli used in these studies differed  at the basic level 
(cat versus dog) or at the subordinate level (office building vs. church) from one another. Objects 
varying at the exemplar level (one church from another church), were not used.  In other words, 
differences between the object stimuli were distinctive enough that expert abilities were not 
necessary to distinguish them.  At the same time, differences between facial stimuli used were 
much more subtle (i.e. at the exemplar level), requiring greater expertise to differentiate them. 
Thus, it is difficult to say whether individuals with autism were better objects than face 
processors, or whether task demands were simply different between these classes of stimuli. 
5.5 BEHAVIORAL STUDIES 
 
Several recent autism behavioral studies (Behrmann et al., 2006; Gastgeb et al., submitted 
for publication) have started to address this issue, with results suggesting a domain-general 
relative lack of expertise in processing perceptual stimuli. For example, Behrmann et al. (2006) 
found that under conditions where fine grained or exemplar-level discrimination of objects was 
required, fourteen individuals with autism were impaired relative to controls.  In this task, the 
authors presented objects that were either similar or different at the basic, subordinate, or 
exemplar level, and participants were asked to designate the pictures as either the “same” or 
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“different.”  Individuals with autism were significantly worse than controls at distinguishing 
exemplar-level differences, suggesting a lack of expertise in object categories.   
Gastgeb et al. (submitted for publication) found that individuals with autism were 
impaired, relative to controls in processing and categorization of object stimuli. Results indicate 
that individuals with autism were less able to categorize category members if those members 
were atypical examples.  The authors speculate that the categorization of atypical category 
members requires a type of processing more similar to that used when discriminating individual 
members of subordinate categories such as desk chairs versus rocking chairs. Since subordinate 
category members look very similar, the discrimination of one category member from another 
involves more complex processes that become available with developing expertise (Tanaka & 
Taylor, 1991; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997).   
 In summary, although the results of the present study indicate that significant face 
processing differences are present by the age of five to seven in children with autism, the results 
cannot provide support for either a domain general cognitive/perceptual processing impairment 
or a domain specific processing impairment. However, Behavioral studies from Berhmann et al., 
(2006) and Gastgeb et al. (submitted for publication) provide preliminary support for a general 
cognitive/perceptual impairment that may affect the development of processing expertise. 
Studies by Gauthier and colleagues (1998, 2000) provide neuroimaging evidence that the FFA 
area of the FG is activated during expert-level processing of complex stimuli, and numerous 
studies have shown hypoactivation in the FFA in individuals with autism.  
     Although the authors of these expert processing studies provide support for a domain general 
cognitive/perceptual explanation of face processing differences in autism, it is important to state 
that many more studies need to be conducted before conclusions can be drawn. This paper has 
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speculated that a general cognitive deficit may be affecting face perception. A 
cognitive/perceptual deficit model, enhanced perceptual functioning, predicts general deficits 
that, if found to occur in Valentine’s face-space framework, could account for the pattern of 
performance in face recognition tasks seen in children with autism.  Although the direction of 
effects is entirely speculative at this point, it seems more difficult to imagine how a social-
specific deficit could account for general cognitive deficits, such as those found in autism.  
 While there have been numerous studies of face processing abilities in older children 
with autism, this is the first study to examine recognition memory, gender identification, and 
identification of expression of emotion in a younger (five to seven) population.  While the cause 
of these deficits is unknown, one possibility is that they represent general deficits in how 
individuals with autism process information.  Unknown, is whether there is developmental 
improvement in face processes.  Studies by Gastgeb et al. (submitted for publication), and 
Strauss, Newell, Giovannelli, & Minshew (in preparation) suggest that with both objects and 
faces, there are improvements in processing information as individuals with autism reach 
adolescence and adulthood.  However, with both objects and faces, they do not develop the same 
level of expertise as do typically developing individuals.  This suggests that perhaps they never 
acquire the ability to truly process stimuli configurally, and compare stimuli to abstracted 
representations.  Finally, the present studies were conducted with individuals who were high 
functioning.  Face and object processing deficits may be more severe in lower functioning 
individuals with autism.  It is also unknown whether these deficits begin within the first year, as 
speculated by Dawson et al. (2005) and Schultz (2005).  Perhaps future studies of this nature 
using infant siblings of children with autism will be able to address this issue.  
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